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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
This brief in support of respondent is filed on behalf
of Dr. Donald Kennedy and Dr. David Kessler, each of
whom served as Commissioner of Food and Drugs at
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Dr. Donald Kennedy, a biologist, served as FDA
Commissioner from 1977 to 1979. Dr. Kennedy then
returned to Stanford University, where he had
previously been a member of the faculty. From 1980 to
1992, Dr. Kennedy served as President of Stanford
University. When he stepped down he returned to the
faculty and is currently a professor emeritus. From
2000 until 2008, Dr. Kennedy also served as
editor-in-chief of Science, the weekly magazine
published by the American Association for the
Advancement of Science.
Dr. David A. Kessler was appointed by President
George H.W. Bush in 1990 to serve as FDA
Commissioner. Dr. Kessler was reappointed to that
position by President William J. Clinton. After serving
as Commissioner for seven years, Dr. Kessler left the
FDA in 1997 to join the Yale School of Medicine as
Dean, a position he held until 2003. From 2003
L Pursuant to Rule 37.6 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States, no counsel for a party authored
this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made
a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation
or submission of this brief. No person other than amici
curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its
preparation or submission. The parties have consented to
the filing of this brief.
2through 2007, Dr. Kessler served as Dean and
Vice-Chancellor of the University of California, San
Francisco, Medical School. Dr. Kessler remains on the
medical school faculty.
Amici file this brief because the pro-preemption
position urged by petitioner and the United States
threatens to undermine, not advance, the underlying
goal of our nation’s drug safety laws, which is "to
protect consumers from dangerous products." United
States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 696 (1948); see also
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 282 (1943).
The nation’s drug safety laws have never placed the
responsibility for drug safety solely on FDA. To the
contrary, they place primary responsibility for safety
squarely on the shoulders of drug manufacturers. To
be sure, FDA also plays an important role; it oversees,
and when necessary compels, compliance with safety
standards. But the ultimate responsibility remains
with the manufacturer. Amici submit that the pro-
preemption arguments pressed by petitioner and the
United States turn that understanding upside down,
relieving manufacturers of front-line responsibility for
the safety of their drugs and handing that job to the
FDA.
Failure-to-warn litigation has always played an
important role in ensuring that manufacturers bear
responsibility for the safety of their drugs. Failure-to-
warn litigation preceded the enactment of the first
federal drug safety law, the Federal Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906, and it has been a complement to
federal enforcement of drug safety laws throughout the
history of FDA and its predecessor agencies. Indeed,
3until 2002, failure-to-warn litigation was seen by both
Congress and FDA as an important adjunct to federal
regulation.
Congress has been particularly attentive to the
federalism issues relating to FDA regulation of drugs
and medical devices, but has never seen fit to preempt
state failure-to-warn claims for drugs. Congress has,
over the years, provided limited preemption of state-
law claims for medical devices specifically approved by
FDA, over-the-counter drugs, and vaccines. Although
Congress has repeatedly revisited the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), including a
significant overhaul in the 2007 Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act, Congress has never
given drug companies the immunity from liability they
covet and now seek from this Court.
Congress’s unwillingness to cut off state failure-to-
warn litigation is in keeping with FDA’s longstanding
judgment that thi s litigation complements the agency’s
regulatory and enforcement activities. At least until
2002, FDA consistently took the position that state
failure-to-warn litigation enhances consumer safety by
serving three critical functions:
* Information: State failure-to warn litigation
augments the FDA’s post-approval surveillance of drug
safety by uncovering hazards unknown to FDA and by
providing information about those hazards to the
agency, physicians and patients;
* Incentives: State failure-to-warn litigation
provides powerful incentives for drug companies to
4disclose safety risks with their products to FDA,
physicians and patients as soon as evidence of a
serious hazard becomes available; and
* Compensation: State failure-to-warn litigation
serves a compensatory justice function una ddressed by
federal law (except for vaccines).
For these reasons, amici submit that the absence of
a robust system of state failure-to-warn litigation
would severely compromise FDA’s ability "to protect
consumers from dangerous products." Both Dr.
Kennedy and Dr. Kessler have set forth their views on
this topic; Dr. Kennedy in an editorial, Misbegotten
Preemptions, 320 Science 585 (May 2, 2008), and Dr.
Kessler in a law review article, David A. Kessler &
David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s
Effort to Preempt Failure-to.Warn Claims, 96 Geo. L.,J.
461 (2008) (hereinafter Kessler & Vladeck).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Troubled by the public health implications of
petitioner’s and the United States’ positions in this
case, amici file this brief to amplify three points that
may not stand out in respondent’s more comprehensive
treatment of the issues:
First, there is no conflict between federal and state
law over the contents of a drug’s label, or a
manufacturer’s duty to warn physicians, patients, and
FDA of emerging safety hazards. To be sure, the
FDCA gives FDA substantial authority over the
labeling and promotion of pharmaceutical products.
5But nothing in the FDCA, or in FDA’s implementing
regulations, relieves a manufacturer of its duty to warn
physicians and patients of emerging safety risks as
soon as that information becomes available. This duty
predates by decades the advent of federal regulation of
drugs. See, e.g., Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397
(1852). FDA’s longstanding regulations make clear
that a drug company has a duty to modify labeling
without delay when hazards emerge with one of its
drugs. The regulations expressly authorize the
company to make labeling changes, and take other
steps to inform physicians and patients of emerging
risks, without advance approval from the agency.
Moreover, failure-to-warn litigation does not
challenge FDA’s decisions about labels; rather, it
challenges a company’s failure to alert physicians and
patients to risks that were unknown or poorly
understood when FDA approved the drug’s label, but
were evident to the company at the time the plaintiff
sustained injury. Litigation of that sort complements,
not undercuts, FDA’s job of protecting consumers from
dangerous drugs.
Second, petitioner’s argument depends on two
related myths: first, that FDA has timely access to
safety information and to resources that enable it to
engage in the day-by-day monitoring of the safety
profile of all of the thousands of drugs on the market;
and second, that FDA’s capacity to keep abreast of
emerging safety information    even after a drug
moves from pre-approval clinical testing to post-
approval use in thousands or millions of patients is
equal to that of the drug’s manufacturer. Neither of
6these myths is true today; neither was true when Dr.
Kennedy and Dr. Kessler headed FDA; and neither will
be true tomorrow. The simple fact is that drug
companies have far superior .information-gathering
tools about the safety profile of the drugs they sell,
while FDA’s tools to keep track of safety hazards post-
approval are imperfect at best. For this reason, FD,A
has always imposed a duty on manufacturers that
parallels and reinforces the same duty state law
imposes    namely, the duty to disclose emerging
safety information to FDA and physicians as soon as it
becomes available. Contrary to petitioner’s claim,
there is no tension between federal and state law; the
requirements imposed by federal regulations and state
duty-to-warn laws are parallel in all material respects.
Third, the background history of state failure-to-
warn litigation over drug products, coupled with
Congress’s unwillingness to include an express
preemption provision in the drug provisions of the
FDCA, counsel strongly against finding implied
preemption in this case. Congress’s refusal to give the
pharmaceutical industry the liability protection it
covets reflects Congress’s judgment that, whatever
tensions might theoretically exist between the FDCA
and application of state law, the benefits to consumer
protection derived from state failure-to-warn litigation
exceed the costs. Leaving Congress’s decision
undisturbed makes particular sense here, where
petitioner’s and FDA’s claims of conflict between state
and federal law are not based on hard evidence of
actual conflict but instead rest only on predictive
judgments unanchored to history.
ARGUMENT
State Failure-to-Warn Litigation Does
Not Conflict With FDA’s Authority Over
Drug Labeling.
Petitioner’s implied preemption argument rests on
the false premise that failure-to-warn litigation seeks
to supplant FDA as final decision-maker as to the
content of drug labeling. That is not so. The FDCA
gives FDAsubstantial authority over druglabeling. 21
U.S.C. § 355(d). Failure-to-warn litigation does not
undercut FDA’s authority over drug labeling; rather, it
challenges the company’s failure to warn doctors and
patients about risks that were unknown or poorly
understood at the time FDA approved the drug and the
label, but were evident to the company at the time the
plaintiff sustained injury.
The emergence of safety hazards that were
unknown or not well understood at the time of a drug’s
approval is commonplace. FDA’s approval process is
not a warrant of the drug’s absolute safety, but is an
assessment of whether the drug’s benefits outweigh its
potential risks based on the evidence available to FDA
at the time.
To obtain approval for a new drug, a manufacturer
must submit a new drug application (NDA) for the
agency’s review. 21 U.S.C. § 355; see generally Kessler
& Vladeck, 96 Geo. L.J. 470-73. The NDA must
include, among other things, full results of all clinical
studies performed on human subjects. Pre-market
human studies generally involve only a few thousand
8subjects and last only a year or so. To control
conditions that might distort the study’s findings,
subjects who take other drugs or have other diseases or
infirmities are excluded. See Kessler & Vladeck, 96
Geo. L.J. at 471. Because of these limitations, pre-
approval testing is generally incapable of detecting
adverse effects that have long latency periods, result
from drug interactions, occur infrequently, or affect
sub-populations excluded from or not adequatel[y
represented in the clinical studies (for example, the
elderly, ethnic minorities, and pregnant women). Id.
Moreover, FDA’s assessment of risks-versus-benefits :is
generally done population-wide, not sub-group by sub-
group, because there are rarely enough clinical trial
participants in a sub-group to permit that degree of
refined analysis. Id. For these reasons, FDA approw~l
of a drug is no guarantee that the drug will not cause
serious adverse effects even if properly used for ills
approved purposes.2
When FDA approves a new drug, it also approw~s
the precise final version of the drug’s label. 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(b)(1)(F). Because the NDA process is intended
provide FDA with all then-existing information about
the drug’s risks, the label approved by the FD.A
represents the agency’s best judgment about risks that
warrant disclosure and those that do not.
~ Professor and former FDA General Counsel
Richard A. Merrill once quipped, "All consumers of
prescription drugs serve as guinea pigs for the
pharmaceutical industry." Compensation for Prescription
Drug Injuries, 59 Va. L. Rev. 1, 20 (1973).
9But the label’s content is not set in stone. Once a
drug enters the marketplace, unanticipated adverse
effects begin to emerge and the drug’s labeling needs to
be revised. Generally labeling changes are initiated by
the manufacturer and subject to FDA pre-approval. 21
C.F.R. § 314.70(b). But there are exceptions. The most
important exception is that "labeling shall be revised
to include a warning as soon as there is reasonable
evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a
drug[.]" 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e) (emphasis added); see
also id. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (imposing requirement in
slightly different language). Statements that may be
added to labels without prior FDA approval are those:
[A] To add or strengthen a contraindication or
warning, precaution, or adverse reaction; [B] To
add or strengthen a statement about drug
abuse, dependence, psychological effect, or
overdosage; [C] To add or strengthen an
instruction about dosage and administration
that is intended to increase the safe use of the
product; [or D] To delete false, misleading, or
unsupported indications for use or claims of
effectiveness.
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A)-(D).
Once a manufacturer adds a warning, it must then
promptly inform FDA of the change being effected (or
CBE) in a supplemental NDA, which FDA reviews
after-the-fact. Id. § 314.70(c). This "safety valve"
option enables a manufacturer to provide physicians,
health care professionals, and patients up-to-date
safety information without the need to secure FDA’s
10
advance approval. And FDA has long made clear that
its labeling rules are no obstacle to a manufacturer
providing safety information to doctors and patients
though labeling, advertising, "Dear Doctor" letters, and
other avenues of communication as soon as tl~Le
manufacturer discovers risks not mentioned on the
label. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,447 (June 26, 1979); 3;0
Fed. Reg. 993 (Jan. 30, 1965).3
As noted, failure-to-warn litigation does not
challenge FDA’s authority over drug labeling, but
instead challenges a company’s failure to take
measures to notify physicians and patients when safety
problems emerge with a drug. These cases seek money
damages for injuries caused by a lack of an adequate
warning, not injunctions or other court decrees to force
labeling changes.4
3 Although petitioner focuses on labeling, failure-to-
warn cases typically challenge the drug company’s failure
to warn, not failure to revise labeling. A drug company can
discharge its duty to warn through other means, including,
for example, "Dear Doctor" letters, information distributed
by the company’s sales-force, advertising and promotional
materials, and other communications with doctors and
patients. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Products Liability
Litigation, 489 F.Supp. 2d 230, 248-60 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(considering but rejecting company’s defense that
prescribing physicians knew of the link between Zypre~;a
and diabetes from the company’s sales representatiwes
even before association appeared on the drug’s label).
Prior to 2002, FDA repeatedly made clear that
(continued...)
11
In failure-to-warn litigation, the plaintiff alleges
that the drug company failed adequately to warn of
risks that were evident to the company, but
undisclosed, at the time the plaintiff was injured.
Almost invariably, the risks at issue were unknown or
poorly understood at the time FDA approved the drug
and its label.5 In a typical case, a judgment in the
plaintiffs favor may result in the company deciding
4(...continued)
agency labeling decisions did not preempt tort liability. See,
e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. at 37,447 (FDA labeling decisions do not
"influence civil tort liability of the manufacturer."); 59 Fed
Reg. 3,944, 3,948 (Jan. 27, 1994) (recognizing that "product
liability plays an important role in consumer protection," in
notice proposing rules to protect the identities of
individuals reporting adverse drug reactions); 63 Fed. Reg.
66,378, 66,384 (Dec. 1, 1998) (observing that FDA labeling
"regulations establish the minimal standards necessary, but
were not intended to preclude the states from imposing
additional labeling requirements," in FDA’s final guidance
on prescription drug labeling).
5 Many of the recent failure-to-warn cases, including
those involving Vioxx, Ortho Evra, Propulsid, Zyprexa, and
Avandia, allege that the drug’s manufacturer withheld
important safety data from FDA. Seeinfra n.ll. The Vioxx
cases underscore that FDA did not understand the
cardiovascular risks posed by the drug at the time of
approval and that Merck withheld information relating to
the drug’s cardiovascular risks from FDA to avoid a
stronger warning on the label. See Thomas O. McGarity,
The Preemption War 1-17 (Yale Univ. Press 2008) (detailing
Vioxx’s regulatory history); McDarby v. Merck, 949 A.2d
223, 231-47 (N.J. App. Div. 2008) (same).
12
that the risk is sufficiently common or grave to
warrant a warning. The company would then ask FDA
to approve a warning change or add a warning to the
label and then seek FDA’s approval. It is also possible
that, regardless of the case’s outcome, safety
information disclosed as a result of the litigation might
prompt FDA to decide that a stronger warning is
appropriate and to initiate discussions with the
company over a labeling change. See Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431,451 (2005) (observing
that state damages litigation "may aid in the exposure
of new dangers associated with" the product and
prompt the agency to "decide that revised labels are
required in light of the new information that has been
brought to its attention.").6
Notwithstanding Wyeth’s efforts to paint this case
otherwise, this is a garden variety failure-to-warn case.
Diana Levine’s injury was caused by the intravenous
administration of Wyeth’s drug Phenergan through the
"direct IV" or "IV push" method, whereby Phenergan :is
supposed to be injected directly into the patient’s vein,
but was instead injected into her artery. Levine ~v.
Wyeth, 2006 VT 107 (2006). The evidence showed that
Wyeth had known for decades that the IV push method
of administration can result in inadvertent contact
6 This happens with some regularity with respect ~o
drug labeling. See, e.g., Aaron Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn,
The Role of Litigation in Defining Drug Risks, 297 JAMA
308, 310 (2007) (citing examples); David B. Ross~ The FDA
and the Case of Ketek, 356 New Eng. J. of Med. 1601 (2007).
13
between the drug and the patient’s artery. When the
drug comes in contact with an artery, the artery can
die and necrosis, gangrene and amputation can result.
Ms. Levine was forced to have her arm amputated due
to the administration of Phenergan through the IV
push method. Id. at ¶2. The evidence showed that
Wyeth failed to instruct physicians not to use push IV,
either in its labeling or otherwise. Id. at ¶3. Indeed,
Wyeth argued that adding the warning Ms. Levine
claimed was lacking     an explicit direction to
physicians not to use IV push "would have harmed
patients by eliminating the IV push as an option for
administering Phenergan." Id. at ¶23; see also id. at
’~3.
To be sure, Wyeth argues that implied preemption
is warranted here because the FDA considered and
rejected the specific warning Ms. Levine claims was
lacking. But both the trial court and the Vermont
Supreme Court rejected that argument as a matter of
fact. Id. at ¶¶21-23. The Vermont Supreme Court
acknowledged that, during the over fifty years that
Phenergan has been approved for use, Wyeth and FDA
twice discussed modifications to the label. Id. But the
Vermont Supreme Court found no evidence that (a)
FDA had ever considered and approved the safety of
the IV push method of administration, (b) FDA had
determined that Ms. Levine’s claim was scientifically
unsubstantiated, (c) FDA intended to prohibit Wyeth
from strengthening its label to warn physicians against
using the IV push method, or (d) FDA made an
affirmative decision to preserve the IV push method of
administration. Id. at ¶23. Wyeth’s arguments to the
contrary are not based on the record.
14
Wyeth’s efforts to obscure the real facts of this case
are not surprising. The reality is that few, if any, cases
fall into the fact pattern that Wyeth alleges occurred
here. Neither Wyeth nor the United States point to
any actual man-bites-dog cases where a company
(which is trying to sell its drug) wants a stronger label
than FDA does, and FDA (which is trying to safeguard
the public health) resists the change.7 In case after
7 Even if such a case arose, the company still may
strengthen its label if, in its view, a stronger warning is
warranted. As one court recently noted, "Although the FDA
might later disapprove of a label strengthened pursuant to
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) and § 201.80, the FDA’s power to
disapprove does not make the manufacturer’s voluntarily
strengthened label a violation of federal law." Tucker v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55919 *
8 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (citations omitted). After all, "FDA might
do nothing, thus giving effect to the change." Id. Even if
FDA disapproves the revised label, "the FDA’s disapproval
is not retroactive []" and the manufacturer may remove the
warning. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(7). In such a
case, the manufacturer would have an airtight regulatory
compliance defense in a tort suit, but if the company never
seeks to change the label, it should not be able to use the
approval requirement as a liability shield. And if the
manufacturer re~ains the label even after FDA’s
disapproval, FDA can, in theory, bring a "misbranding"
action in court, and a jury would decide the question.
Tucker, at * 8 & n.3; 21 U.S.C. § 352(a), (i), (j). To amici’s
knowledge, FDA has never brought a misbranding action
under these circumstances. Cfo Feldman v. Lederle Labs.,
592 A.2d 1176, 1193 (N.J. 1991) ("for the FDA to have
prevented a drug manufacturer from warning the public of
(continued...)
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case, companies fight stronger warnings that might
discourage doctors from prescribing their drugs and
thereby undermine the drugs’ profitability,s For
instance, it took FDA over a year to force Merck, the
manufacturer of Vioxx, to add a statement about
Vioxx’s cardiovascular risks to the drug’s label. Merck
fought hard because it had determined that a
"warning" rather than a "precaution" on Vioxx’s label
could lead to a 50% reduction in Vioxx’s sales.9 During
the year-long negotiations between Merck and FDA, no
change was made to Vioxx’s label, and in the end, the
FDA accepted a compromise: The statement about
cardiovascular risk was added to the "precaution"
7(...continued)
a newly-discovered danger . . . ’would seem anomalous.’")
(citation omitted).
s See, e.g., Kessler & Vladeck, 96 Geo. L. J. at 480
(and authorities cited therein); McDarby v. Merck. 949 A.2d
at 238-48 (account of dispute between Merck and FDA over
Vioxx’s label); In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 501
F. Supp. 2d 776, 779, 783 (E.D. La. 2007) (same); Margaret
A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, From the Wrong End of a
Telescope: A Response to Professor David Bernstein, 104
Mich. L. Rev. 1983, 1987-88 (2006) (recounting Sandoz’s
effort to avoid labeling changes for its lactation-suppressing
drug Parlodel, which it ultimately withdrew from the
market).
9 McDarby v. Merck, 949 A.2d at 241. See also Alex
Berenson, Eli Lilly Said to Play Down Risk of Top Pill, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 17, 2006, at A1 (discussing Eli Lilly’s effort to
avoid a warning on Zyprexa, its best selling schizophrenia
medication, for diabetes risk).
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section of the label as Merck urged, not to the
"warning" section, notwithstanding FDA’s judgment
that a warning was appropriate. See Kessler &
Vladeck, 96 Geo. L.J. at 480 & n.82 (citing
congressional testimony of FDA officials
acknowledging that FDA did not have the power to
compel Merck to add a warning to Vioxx’s label).1°
As is clear, contrary to the submissions of petitioner
and the United States, there is no conflict between the
application of state failure-to-warn litigation and
FDA’s authority over drug labeling. These regimes
have co-existed without friction for the entire life-spm~
of the agency. Nothing in this case or in the reasoned
decision of the Vermont Supreme Court threatens
FDA’s ability to control drug labeling. For that reason
the judgment below should be affirmed.
10 The 2007 Amendments to the FDCA give FDA, for
the first time, the authority to compel a manufacturer to
add warnings to a drug’s label. 21 U.S.C. § 505(0)(4). Eve~.~
so, this power is significantly circumscribed and cannot, as
an ordinary matter, be used by the agency unilaterally or
immediately. FDA may ’,accelerate" the process when "a
labeling change is necessary to protect the public health."
But the agency may not bypass the process set up in the
Act. Id. at § 505(o)(4)(H); See also Kessler & Vladeck, 96
Geo. L. J. at 467-68 n.24.
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II. FDA’s Post-Approval Monitoring
System Cannot, On Its Own, Adequately
Safeguard Public Health.
The pro-preemption arguments advanced by
petitioner and the United States fail for another
reason: They significantly overstate FDA’s ability to
police the marketplace on its own, without the
backstop of state failure-to-warn litigation. The
question before this Court is whether state failure-to-
warn litigation jeopardizes the fulfillment of the
FDCA’s goal, namely, "to protect consumers from
dangerous products." United States v. Sullivan, 332
U.S. at 696.
The short answer to that question is "no." State
failure-to-warn litigation plays an indispensable role in
achieving that goal. The fundamental problem FDA
faces is that, by necessity, drugs are approved on the
basis of less-than-perfect knowledge. Risks that are
rare, have long latency periods, result from drug
interactions, or have adverse impacts on sub-
populations often go undetected in clinical testing.
Despite FDA’s recent claims, the agency cannot single-
handedly perform the Herculean job of monitoring the
safety of every one of the 11,000 or so drugs on the
market. Until 2002, FDA recognized that failure-to-
warn litigation served as an important backstop to the
agency’s own efforts. See Kessler & Vladeck, 96 Geo.
L.J. at 483-86.
Nonetheless, petitioner and the United States paint
a portrait of FDA that is unrealistic. Contrary to their
claims, FDA does not have timely access to safety
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information and other resources to enable it to engage
in a day-by-day monitoring of the safety profile of every
one of the thousands of drugs on the market (not to
mention medical devices, food products, blood products
and other biologics, and the hundreds of other
consumer products FDA regulates), let alone the
capacity to monitor the safety profile of an individual
drug that is even remotely equivalent to that of the
drug’s manufacturer. Id. There are several reasons
why the Court should be skeptical of petitioner’s ancl
the United States’ arguments about FDA’s ability to
police the market on its own.
First, these arguments are called into doubt by
recent history. In the past few years, FDA has faced a
flood of high-profile regulatory failures with recently
approved drugs, including pain medications Viox~,
Celebrex, and Bextra, the diabetes drugs Avandia and
Rezulin, and the heartburn drug Propulsid. In each of
these cases, there was a substantial delay between
when the manufacturer had "reasonable evidence of an
association of a serious hazard" with its drug (see 21
C.F.R. §§ 201.57(c)(6)(i), 201.80(e)), and when the
manufacturer provided that information to FDA or
took action to warn physicians or patients. See id. (a
manufacturer shall revise labeling once it has
reasonable evidence of an association).11
11 See, e.g., Darby v. Merck, 949 A.2d a~ 241-44
(pointing out Merck’s delays in reporting information about
Vioxx’s cardiovascular risks co FDA); Alex Berenson &
Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Says 1999 Trials Revealed Risks
With Celebrex. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2005, A1 (reporting that
(continued..,.)
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Second, FDA’s post-approval surveillance
resources do not match FDA’s rhetoric. Both the
Institute of Medicine (IOM) and the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) have issued reports highly
critical of FDA’s surveillance programs, with the IOM
concluding that the programs detect at most a "small
fraction of all adverse effects of drugs.’’12 Detection is
11(...continued)
Pfizer acknowledged withholding from FDA for two years
study showing serious cardiovascular risk with Celebrex);
Gardiner Harris and Eric Koli, Lucrative Drug, Danger
Signals and the FDA, N.Y. Times, June 10, 2005 (discussing
delays in reporting safety information on heartburn
medication Propulsid); Denise Grady, FDA Reviews
Accusations About Diabetes Drug, N.Y, Times, Mar. 16,
2000 (reporting that FDA records showed that company
failed to submit safety data on diabetes drug Rezulin);
Gardiner Harris & Alex Berenson, Drug Makers Near Old
Goal: A Legal Shield, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 2008, A1
(reporting that documents obtained during litigation
showed that Johnson & Johnson delayed informing the
FDA for years that Ortho Evra, a birth control patch,
delivered far more estrogen than it claimed, increasing the
risks of blood clots and strokes, and noting that "[i]n the
last decade, suits over Zyprexa, the withdrawn pain pill
Vioxx, the withdrawn diabetes medicine Rezulin, the
withdrawn heartburn medicine Propulsid and several
antidepressants have shown that companies played down
the risks of their medicines.").
12 IOM, The Future of Drug Safety, Promoting and
Protecting the Health of the Public 51, 53 (2006) (hereinafter
"IOM Report"); GAO, Drug Safety: Improvement Needed in
(continued...)
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not the only problem. As the IOM put it, "It]he existing
regulatory framework is structured around the
premarketing testing process; few tools are available
for addressing postmarketing issues, short of the blunt
instruments available to respond to clear-cut
adulteration and misbranding." IOM Report at 153.
Even if these programs are strengthened, top dow~.~
FDA surveillance is no substitute for failure-to-warn
litigation, which provides FDA, doctors and patients
with safety information that is otherwise unavailable
to the agency~
Third, petitioner’s argument assumes that FDA
and a drug manufacturer have equal access to
information about emerging safety hazards with the
manufacturer’s drug.    That is not the case.
Manufacturers have superior resources that are
committed to overseeing the safety of the drugs they
market. As a result, manufacturers invariably get
safety information before the FDA does and have
access to information that is not available to FDA.
This fact should not be surprising. Drug companies
have dedicated sales forces (detailmen) who visit with
doctors quite frequently (weekly or, at times, more
12(...continued)
FDA’s Postmarket Decision-Making and Oversight Process
18 (2006) (hereinafter "GAO Drug Safety"). Although the
2007 Amendments bolster FDA’s authority in this area, the
reforms available under the Amendments will take
considerable time to implement and their success is
uncertain. Kessler & Vladeck, 96 Geo. L.J. at 489-91.
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often). Detailmen serve as an early warning system
when problems begin to emerge with a drug and as a
means by which drug companies disseminate risk
information to doctors.13 Drug companies also sponsor
trials of approved drugs to see if they are effective for
new uses not approved by the FDA. For instance, a
study on Vioxx in Alzheimer’s patients showed a higher
incidence of cardiovascular events than did the placebo
group, but Merck did not disclose the study’s results to
1~ There are an estimated 90,000 drug company
sales representatives (detailmen) in the United States. See,
e.g., Stephanie Saul, Gimme an Rx! Cheerleaders Pep Up
Drug Sales, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 2005, A1; Stephanie Saul,
Drug Makes Pay for Lunch as they Pitch, N.Y. Times, July
28, 2006, A1; Stephanie Saul, Doctor Says Drug Maker
Tried to Quash His Criticism of Avandia, N.Y. Times, June
7, 2007, A1 (reporting that FDA reprimanded Glaxo, the
manufacturer of Avandia, for having its detailmen play
down drug’s risks to doctors): Alex Berenson, Drug Files
Show Maker Promoted Unapproved Use, N.Y. Times, Dec.
18, 2006, A1 (reporting that Eli Lilly detailmen promoted
Zyprexa, a powerful drug for schizophrenia and bipolar
disorder, for patients who had neither illness). GAO
reports that FDA lacks the resources to police effectively
drug company promotional efforts. GAO, Prescription
Drugs: FDA Oversight of the Promotion of Drugs for Off-
Label Uses 6, 9, 24-26, 41-46 (July 2008). The role of
detailmen has been pivotal in some failure-to-warn cases.
See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, 489 F.
Supp. 2d at 248-60; Tatum v. Schering Corp., 795 F.2d 925
(11th Cir. 1986); McDarby v. Merck, 949 A.2d at 248-49.
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FDA for over a year.14 And drug companies have
physicians on staff or contract with physicians to
evaluate the safety profile of drugs, but the~,~e
evaluations are not generally shared with FDA.15
Thus, although each drug company has an
obligation to report evidence of safety problems in
patients treated with a drug, see, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§
310.305; 312.32(d)(3), there is no corresponding
obligation to report the impression of company doctors
and scientists, who generally know more about tl~Le
company’s drug and the risks it might pose than their
counterparts at the FDA. For these reasons, failure-
to-warn litigation has time and again uncovered safety
information that was known to the drug company but
not provided to, or otherwise available to, FDA.
Kessler & Vladeck, 96 Geo. L.J. 491-95 (and
authorities cited therein).
14 McDarby v. Merck, 949 A.2d at 241.
~ See, e.g., Daniel Carlat, Op-Ed, Diagnosis: Conflict
of Interest, N.Y. Times, June 13, 2007, at A21 (explaining
that "[b]ecause pharmaceutical companies set much of the
agenda for what doctors learn about drugs, crucial
information about potential drug dangers is played down,
to the detriment of patient care.") (discussing Avandia and
Vioxx as examples); Alex Berenson, Eli Lilly Said to Play
Down Risk of Top Pill, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 2006, A1
(reporting that emails and memos from Eli Lilly’s top
doctors and managers, discovered in litigation, show
company!s effort to play down the risk of diabetes with its
blockbuster drug Zyprexa).
23
Fourth, even with the 2007 Amendments, the FDA
faces a daunting future. A report issued in November
2007 by a blue-ribbon panel appointed by FDA
concluded, "The scientific demands on the Agency far
exceed its capacity to respond. This imbalance is
imposing a significant risk to the integrity of the...
regulatory system, and hence to the safety of the
public." FDA Science Board, FDA Science and Mission
at Risk: A Report of the Subcommittee on Science and
Technology § 1.1 (2007) (hereinafter "FDA Science and
Mission at Risk"). This conclusion echoes that of IOM,
which warned that FDA "lacks the resources to
accomplish its large and complex mission today, let
alone to position itself for an increasingly challenging
future." IOM Report at 193.
As FDA’s panel observed, the agency has enormous
and growing responsibilities, but Congress has
essentially flat-lined its appropriations. When the
FDCA was enacted in 1938, Congress gave FDA a
mandate "to review and approve prior to marketing,
the safety of color additives, human food additives and
animal feed additives, as well as to review and approve
the safety and effectiveness of new human drugs, new
animal drugs, human biological products and medical
devices for human use." FDA Science and Mission at
Risk, § 2.1. Since 1938, Congress has enacted "125
statutes that directly impact FDA’s regulatory
responsibilities," by requiring "the development of
implementing regulations, guidance or other types of
policy, and some require the establishment of entire
new regulatory programs. Virtually all require some
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type of scientific knowledge or expertise for the agency
to address them." Id.
Despite the addition of all of these requirements,
Congress did not provide "an appropriation of new
personnel and increased funding designed to allow
adequate implementation." Id. Indeed, during the
past two decades, the agency’s funding and staffing
levels have remained static. For these and other
reasons, the report concludes that "[t]his reality,
combined with a burgeoning industry.., has made it
increasingly impossible for the FDA to maintain its
historic public health mission." Id.; see also icl.
Appendix B, Peter Barton Hutt, The State of Science at
the Food and Drug Administration, at B-24 - B-34.
Each of these factors undercuts the claim that FDA
can, on its own, single-handedly police the safety of
every drug on the market. Taken together, these
factors underscore amici’s concern that finding state
failure-to-warn cases preempted would deprive FDA of
important safety information and would remove
existing incentives that press drug companies to report
and promptly respond to emerging safety hazards. For
this reason too, the judgment below should be affirmed.
III. Congress’s Refusal To Preempt Failure-
To-Warn Claims Counsels Against Finding
Implied Preemption.
The history of the evolution of the drug safety laws
in the United States casts further doubt on petitioner’s
and the United States’ implied preemption arguments.
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After all, failure-to-warn litigation has been a constant
feature of personal injury litigation in the courts of the
United States since the mid-Nineteenth Century. One
of the early drug liability cases, Thomas v. Winchester,
6 N.Y. 397, dates back to 1852. Since that time, there
has been a steady procession of failure-to-warn cases
involving drug products.16
Congress of course is presumed to have been aware
of this litigation when it enacted the Federal Pure Food
and Drugs Act of 1906, when it enacted the FDCA in
1938, and when it made major amendments to the
FDCA in 1962, 1997 and 2007. See, e.g., Bates, 544
U.S. at 449-450; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,166-67 (1989).
But there is no need for guesswork about Congress’s
judgment about the federalism questions relating to
pharmaceutical products. There are no fewer than
1~ See, e.g., Brunswig v. White, 8 S.W. 85 (Tex. 1888);
Blood Balm v. Cooper, 10 S.E. 118 (Ga. 1889); cf. Howes v.
Rose, 42 N.E. 303 (Ind. App. 1895). After the passage of the
1906 Act, failure-to-warn litigation continued in the courts.
See, e.g., Moehlenbrock v. Parke, Davis & Co., 169 N.W. 541
(Minn. 1918); Valmas Drug Co. v. Smoots, 269 F. 356 (6th
Cir. 1920); Henry v. Judge & Dolph Drug Coi, 245 S.W. 358
(Mo. Ct. App. 1922); Campbell v. Stamper Drug Co., 277 P.
770 (Colo. 1929); Halloran v. Parke, Davis & Co., 245 A.D.
727 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935); Wright v. Carter Products, 244
F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957); Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411
F.2d 1390, 1402 (8t~ Cir. 1969).
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three express preemption provisions that reflect
Congress’s attention to the federalism issue.
One of these provisions--the preemption provisi~,n
of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k has been the subject of two recent decisions
by this Court. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999
(2008), and Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470
(1996).
Another statute, The National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1, et seq., was
enacted by Congress to provide a means of resolving
claims of injury as a result of vaccine administration
that was less costly and more expeditious than
conventional tort litigation. The Vaccine Injury Act
requires that certain claims first be brought before the
Vaccine Court, but permits the claimant to pursue tort
litigation if disappointed with the Vaccine Court’s
disposition. See generally Schafer v. American
Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1 (Ft Cir. 1994) (Breyer, J.)
(describing background and operation of the Act).~
~v The Vaccine Act also shows that Congress did not
intend to curtail tort remedies for those injured by unsafe
drugs and vaccines. Congress could have preempted
vaccine claims, but instead carved them out of the general
tort system, and included a back-end opt out for claimants
who think that they can do better in the tort system. The
Vaccine Act also demonstrates that the FDCA provides
injured parties no compensatory remedies. To be sure, the
FDA has brought at least one misbranding action for an
(continued...)
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A third provision, added by Congress in 1997 in the
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act,
preempts state labeling requirements for non-
prescription drugs that are "different from or in
addition to" those imposed by the FDCA. The
provision goes on to say that it shall not be "construed
to modify or otherwise affect the liability of any person
under the product liability law of any State." 21 U.S.C.
§ 379r(a), (e).
Congress has never seen fit to enact a preemption
provision with respect to drugs. Indeed, Congress
twice has explicitly declined to do so. First, in the 1962
amendments to the FDCA, which require FDA to
ensure that a drug is effective as well as safe before the
drug is approved, Congress made clear its intent not to
preempt claims relying on state common law: "Nothing
in the amendments       shall be construed as
invalidating any provision of State law which would be
valid in the absence of such amendments unless there
is a direct and positive conflict between such
amendments and such provision of State law." Drug
17(...continued)
injunction and restitution against companies selling an
unapproved drug, but the only remedy available for injured
consumers is the reimbursement of the modest sums they
paid for the unapproved product; tort damages are not
available. United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d
219, 231 (3d Cir. 2005) (upholding restitution order against
companies selling shark cartilage as cancer remedy).
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Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat.
780, 793.is
When Congress revisited the FDCA in 2007, drug
companies hoped that it would add an express
preemption provision barring tort litigation. Congress
did not do so. To the contrary, Congress adopted a
"rule of construction" that establishes that FDA’s new
authority to compel companies to make labeling
changes does not alter a manufacturer’s obligation "to
maintain its label in accordance with existing
requirements, including subpart B of part 201 and
sections 314.70 and 601.12 of title 21, Code of Federal
Regulations (or any successor regulations)." 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(o)(4)(I). The references to the Code of Federal
Regulation are to regulations that mandate that drug
companies shall revise a drug’s label to include a
warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an
association of a serious hazard with the drug, and may
do so without FDA’s advance approval. See 21 C.F.R.
§§ 201.57(c)(6)(i); 201.80(e); 314.70; and 601.12. This
is The provision’s language underscores Congress’s
judgment not to displace state product liability law, but to
preserve it. See California Federal Say. & Loan Ass’n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 283 n.12 (1987) (explaining anti-
preemption thrust of phrase "a direct and positive conflict");
Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 132 n.3 (1965)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (same). The provision explicitly
displaces only positive state law only where there is "a
direct and positive conflict" between the FDCA’s new
effectiveness requirements and s~ate law. Congress
refrained from using broader language that might
encompass other state law requirements, such as tort law.
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"rule of construction" was added by the House to
"clarify that nothing in this legislation or in current
law is intended to preempt remedies for consumers
injured by dangerous drugs." H.R. Rep. No. 110-225,
at 197 (2007); see also 153 Cong. Rec. $11,831-34 (Sept.
20, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); id. at Sll,834
(statement of Sen. Leahy); id. at S 11,835 (statement of
Sen. Durbin). The provision did not sit well with
Members of Congress who wanted to add a preemption
provision to the Act. See, e.g., id. at $11,836-37
(statement of Sen. Allard).
In the face of the long and unbroken history of
failure-to-warn litigation over drug products, and
Congress’s refusal to add a preemption provision to
federal law, this Court should be especially wary of
taking a step that Congress has refrained from taking.
There can be no question that Congress is well aware
of the dynamic between state failure-to-warn litigation
and FDA regulation of drug labeling. And there can be
no question that Congress has decided that the two
systems ought to co-exist, notwithstanding any tension
that might arise, because the benefits of permitting the
systems to operate in tandem outweigh any costs that
might be incurred. That decision is plainly one that
Congress is empowered to make.
This point takes on additional force here, because
the "evidence" of the tension between FDA regulation
of drugs and state failure-to-warn litigation is not
simply thin, it is non-existent. Instead of coming
forward with hard evidence of actual conflicts that
is, cases in which FDA’s primacy over drug labeling
has been compromised or even seriously threatened by
30
failure-to warn litigation petitioner and the United
States rely on what are at most predictive judgments
that are unanchored in history. This Court’s conflict
preemption jurisprudence requires far more than that.
See, e.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51
(2002) (refusing to find conflict preemption where there
was no evidence that application of state law would
frustrate federal interests); Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,881-83 (2000) (finding conflict
preemption based on an after-the-fact assessment of
actual frustration of federal interests). For these
reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment below.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in respondenl~’s
brief, the judgment below should be affirmed.
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